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Michae l  F. Noone and  Mary  Jo  Wi ley  
Sticks, Stones and Broken Bones: 
Military Law's Criteria for 
Aggravated Assault 
Abstract: In light of recent military court decisions, this article asks whether 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be revised to encompass batteries which 
do not satisfy the present nineteenth century definition of grievous bodily harm. In 
answering this question, the article first traces the evolution of the military law of 
battery. Current medical views on the consequences of a criminal attack, particu- 
larly the psychic effects of violence, are then explored, concluded with a discussion 
of the competing considerations which should affect any decision to change the law. 
"We fought "bout a dog-- last week it were-- 
No more than a round or two; 
But I strook "im cruel "ard, an "I wish I "adn't now, 
Which is just  what a man can't do." 
Rudyard Kipling, "Follow Me "Ome " 
Introduction 
Kipling's poem fairly expresses nineteenth-century attitudes. Men--at least 
those men from the class which supplied common soldiers--fought among them- 
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selves. And, while fighting was deprecated, it was not considered a serious crime. 
Battery, the unlawful application of force to the person of another, was a common- 
law misdemeanor. If, however, the victim's ability to defend himself or annoy his 
adversary was permanently impaired, the common law punished the offense as the 
felony of mayhem. 1 This distinction, based on the severity of the physical conse- 
quences of the attack, still operates in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and this 
article is intended to explore the consequences of the distinction in a military which 
expects its members to exercise self control in ways quite foreign to Kipling's time. 
The 1989 court-martial of Specialist Dormell O. Jones, 3d Armored Division illus- 
trates the difference. 2 
On the evening of April 28, 1989, four Army enlisted men's wives took a 
"ladies' night out," in Giessen, Germany? After drinks and a show at one club, they 
went to another, The Big Apple, where they danced and chatted with the patrons. As 
they left the club early in the morning of the 29th, they noticed a fast-food stand 
(imbiss) and decided to purchase french fries. There was a long line and they didn't 
know where it ended. Specialist Donnell Jones, a Bradley fighting vehicle mechanic 
with five years of service, was standing in line with a friend and offered to place 
their order for them and they gave him money to do so. Jones subsequently placed 
his order and was served. As he started to leave the building he told the women to 
wait for their food. One of the women, Mrs. Lisa Vender, thought he was leaving 
with their money and, as he walked away, grabbed him by the back of the shirt, 
demanded their money, and as he continued toward the exit, snatched the currency 
he was holding in his left hand, thus dislodging the food he was carrying. Jones 
struck her once in the face, giving her a black eye, a small cut on her nose, and 
fracturing the bridge of her nose. Despite his pleas of not guilty, Jones was subse- 
quently convicted by a general court-martial of larceny and assault in which griev- 
ous bodily harm was intentionally inflicted. 4 He was sentenced to a bad conduct 
discharge, conirmement for two years, forfeiture of all pay, and reduction to the 
lowest enlisted grade. 
On appeal, Jones' military lawyer argued that the injuries Mrs. Vender sus- 
tained did not meet he legal definition of "grievous bodily harm.'5 An Army Court 
of Military Review agreed and, on November 28, 1990, while affirming the larceny 
finding and a finding of simple battery, returned the case for a rehearing on the 
punishment. 6 On February 28, 1991 the Army determined that a rehearing was not 
practicable and granted Jones' request for a "discharge for the good of the service," 
restoring all rights, privileges, and property he lost as a result of his court-martial. 7 
The following month, Jones' lawyer used the case in an article emphasizing that 
trial defense counsel should not concede that an injury satisfied the law's require- 
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ments and noting the difference in maximum punishments available under the Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice. 8A simple battery can be punished by no more than a 
bad conduct discharge, and confinement for six months while the aggravated of- 
fense provides for a maximum punishment of confmement for up to five years and 
a dishonorable discharge. 9 
On reflection, one might wonder whether the law's distinctions are appropri- 
ate in the late twentieth century. Should some provision be made for the emotional-- 
as opposed to the physical--consequences of a battery? The prosecutor in the Jones 
case asked only two questions of the victim regarding her injuries: 
Q. "How much pain were you in after you were hit?" 
A. "I had headaches for a couple of days. I remember it was especially hard 
because my husband was gone [on] T[emporary] D[ut]Y and I had two kids. 
I had a very bad headache. It was hard to go to sleep at night. And then, 
again, from having the cold and trying to blow my nose, sir, it was very 
difficult. I couldn't squeeze any kleenex or anything up my nose. At first-- 
I'd say for about--At least he fin-st couple of weeks was like that." 
Q. "And how severe was the pain that evening and the next morning? light? 
moderate? orheavy?" 
A. "I would say--Well, at fu'st, it was more like a stun. I think it got worse as 
the day went on. I got more of a headache. At first it was moderate and then 
it got heavy at night especially, m°
Our article asks whether the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be re- 
vised to encompass batteries which do not satisfy the present nineteenth-century 
definition of grievous bodily harm. In answering the question, we will first trace the 
origins of the present Code's provisions. Then we will discuss changing medical 
attitudes towards trauma victims, and conclude with discussion of the competing 
considerations which should affect any decision to change the law. 
The Evolution of the Military Law of Battery 
The Massachusetts Articles of War, adopted by the Provisional Congress of 
Massachusetts Bay on April 5, 1775 provided in its Sixth Article for punishment of 
batteries on superior officers, and in its Twenty Third Article for violence against 
persons bringing provisions into the camp. Other batteries would be prosecuted 
under the Forty-Ninth (general) article which provided for the punishment of "All 
crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which Officers and Soldiers may 
be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not men- 
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tioned in the Articles of War...,,H For nearly a century--unt i l  the Articles of War 
were revised in 1874--Col .  Winthrop's treatise on Military Law reports that: 
... courts-martial were not invested, either in peace or in war, with a jurisdic- 
tion of the violent crimes cognizable by the civil courts, except where the same 
directly prejudiced "good order and military discipline." In 1863, however-- 
during the late civil war--the provision incorporated in [the 1874 revision] 
initiated in our military law the marked innovation of investing eneral courts- 
martial with jurisdiction, in time of war &c., of the graver civil crimes when 
committed by military persons, without regard to whether such crimes directly 
prejudice military discipline or affect the military service. Its main objective 
evidently was to provide for the punishment of those crimes in localities where, 
in consequence of military occupation, or the prevalence of martial aw, the 
action of the civil courts is suspended, or their authority can not be exercised 
with the promptitude and efficiency required by the exigencies of the period 
and the necessities of military government? 2 
The enactment Winthrop referred to was the Fifty-Eighth Article of War which, in 
the 1874 revision, provided that: 
In time of war, insurrection, orrebellion, larceny, robbery, burglary, arson, may- 
hem, manslaughter, murder, assault and battery with an intent o kill, wound- 
ing, by shooting or stabbing with an intent o commit rape, shall be punishable 
by the sentence of a general court-martial, when committed by persons in the 
military service of the United States, and the punishment inany such case shall 
not be less than the punishment provided, for the like offence, by the laws of the 
State, Territory or District in which such offence may have been committed. 13 
Thus the 1874 revision provided for four categories of assault and battery 
over which a court-martial could exercise jurisdiction: 
- -  assaults or batteries directed toward a superior officer in the execution of ffice, 
punishable by death, or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, under 
Article 21; 
- -  violence inflicted on a person bringing provisions into a camp, garrison, or quar- 
ters in foreign parts, punishable by death or other punishment under Article 58; 
- -  "serious" assaults and batteries involving the intent to kill or commit rape, and 
woundings by shooting or stabbing. These offenses, which need not have service 
connection (other than the military status of the offender and the fact that the of- 
fense occurred in time of war or rebellion) would be punishable under Article 58, 
utilizing whatever sanctions were provided for by local law. 
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- -  All other assaults and batteries which would be to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline would be punishable under Article 62, "according to the nature and de- 
gree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of the court. "~3" 
We observe that the maximum punishment that could be invoked might de- 
pend on the status of the victim (Articles 21 and 58), or the state of national emer- 
gency and the provisions of local law (Article 58), or may be left to the discretion of 
the court-martial (Article 62), which was in turn restrained by a table of maximum 
punishments i sued by the President. 14 The Articles made no provision for consider- 
ing the severity of the injury in determining what offense should be charged, nor did 
they provide that the severity of the victim's injuries should affect the maximum 
punishment that could be imposed. 
When the Articles of War were revised in the aftermath of World War I, the 
provisions regarding assault and battery remained substantially unchanged. The 
Articles of War of 1920 maintained the four categories established in 187415: 
- -  assaults on superior officers and noncommissioned officers were punishable under 
Articles 64 and 65 respectively; in the former case the death punishment was per- 
mitted; otherwise, punishment was left o the President to prescribe. The Manual 
for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army 1928, published as an executive order, provided 
that attempted assaults on warrant or noncommissioned officers could be punished 
by confinement a hard labor not to exceed six months while striking a warrant or 
noncommissioned officer could be punished by a Dishonorable Discharge and a 
year's imprisonment, t6 
- -  intimidation of persons bringing provisions into camp remained punishable under 
Article 88 as the court might direct. The offense isnot discussed in the Manual nor 
was a maximum punishment established by executive order which suggests that 
the offense had fallen into desuetude. 
- -  "serious" assaults were punishable under Article 93 but the requirement for a 
national emergency was eliminated as was reference to punishments permitted 
by the state where the crime occurred. An elaborate table of maximum punish- 
ments was established: any serious assault (with intent o do bodily harm; with a 
dangerous instrument; or with intent o commit a felony) warranted a Dishonor- 
able Discharge; if the intent was to commit murder o  rape, the maximum period 
of confinement was twenty years; if the intent was to commit some other felony, 
the maximum was ten years; if the intent was to do bodily harm with a dangerous 
weapon, five years; and assault with intent o do bodily harm warranted a maxi- 
mum punishment of one year. ]7 
- -  other assaults were punishable under the 96th Article as "crimes, not capital and 
not made punishable by another Article of War, which are committed in violation 
of public law as enforced by the civil power, m8 The maximum punishment for 
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assault was confinement for three months; the maximum confinement for assault 
and battery was six monthsJ 9 
When, in 1950, Congress combined the Articles of War (applicable to the 
Army and Air Force) with the Naval Articles (applicable to the Navy, Marine Corps 
and Coast Guard) and passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice one could still 
perceive the lineaments of the 1775 Massachusetts Articles) °Batteries on superiors 
were still treated as separate offenses (Articles 90 and 91) warranting a Dishonor- 
able Discharge and extended confinement--ten years if an officer, five years if the 
victim was a warrant officer and a year if a noncommissioned officer. 21 While vio- 
lence directed at persons bringing provisions into camp was no longer treated as a 
separate offense, assault was still treated under the general article, Article 134, which 
encompassed disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline, 
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and of- 
fenses not capital. For the first time in one hundred and seventy five years, assault 
was given its own Article--128--and redefined. 
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents offers a representative nineteenth 
century definition of the offense: 
A battery, or assault and battery,--for the two terms are substantially equiva- 
lent, every battery including an ass ult,--is any unlawful violence inflicted 
upon a person without his or her consent. A threatening of violence, or at- 
tempt or offer to exert force against another will notsuffice, since this would 
be no more than an assault--the assault which is only preliminary to a 
battery. 22 
The 1950 provision deffmed assault in much the same way, as an attempt or offer to 
do bodily harm to another, and battery as the application of force to the person of 
another. 23 However, Article 128 defined a new offense: aggravated assault which 
can occur either when the means used is likely to produce death or grievous bodily 
harm or when, irrespective of the means used, grievous bodily harm is inflicted. 
This article is intended to reflect on the term "grievous bodily harm," and the way 
courts have interpreted it.
When Congress created the new offense of aggravated assault and provided 
that the severity of harm to the victim would be one of the offenses's defining char- 
acteristics, it followed British practice when the common law crimes of battery and 
mayhem were replaced bystatute in the Offenses Against Persons Act, 1861. 24 This 
model was subsequently followed by a number of states. 25 The British statute did 
not define grievous bodily harm. 26 
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The Manual for Courts Martial 195 l's explanation of grievous bodily harm 
said that the term "does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or bloody 
nose, but does include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the 
body, serious damage to internal organs and other serious bodily injuries. "27 The 
examples raise definitional problems: does any broken bone satisfy the criterion? 
how deep must a cut be to make it grievous? what is a "tom member?" when is 
damage to internal organs erious? how does one distinguish between serious and 
trivial bodily injuries? The drafters of the explanation may have expected that ex- 
pert medical testimony would be necessary in order to establish that the harm was 
grievous. The physician would explain why the injury was serious or why not, guided 
by the law's criteria. As in the case of a plea of insanity, the issue would be one of 
fact and the opinion of an expert witness, while it might be given greater weight 
than that of a lay witness, would not oblige the court to arrive at a particular find- 
ing.2S Alternatively, the drafters may have intended that the court draw on its own 
experience in deciding whether the harm was grievous. 29 
The term "grievous bodily harm" must be interpreted: by legal officers who 
have to recommend what offense should be charged; by trial judges who must de- 
cide whether there is sufficient evidence of the offense to warrant sending the 
government's case to the jury; by juries, who must decide whether they are satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense has been committed; and by appeals 
courts in the military justice system, who must decide whether the trial judge erred 
in permitting the case to go to the jury. 31Service appeals courts, originally called 
boards of review, were given the authority, in reviewing the record of trial "... to 
weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted 
questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. "32 
Appeals court decisions are published and the rules of law they apply serve as pre- 
cedent in deciding subsequent cases. The doctrine of stare decisis invokes the prin- 
ciple that a legal rule, and its rationale, should be applied in similar cases. An appeals 
court ruling that specific injuries did, or did not, constitute grievous bodily harm 
does not constitute binding precedent but offers criteria which legal authorities can 
use in deciding whether agiven injury satisfies the law's requirements. A survey of 
appeals courts' decisions will indicate the military's approach to the problem posed 
by the Manual's vague definition of grievous bodily harm. 
The first reported ecision interpreting the Manual's provisions was United 
States v. Lee, in which the accused had been convicted of murdering one man and 
wounding another. 33 The survivor had been shot in the neck and, in the course of its 
1952 opinion, an Army Board of Review affirmed a conviction of aggravated as- 
sault, stating "The nature of the injury clearly brings it within the Manual [for Courts 
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Martial]'s provision for 'grievous bodily harm.'" The defense had not contended 
that the wound was minor so the case has little precedential value. 
In United States v. Lara, another 1952 Army Board of Review decision, three 
soldiers were convicted of intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm "to wit: 
numerous cuts, abrasions, lacerations, and bruises of the face, body, head and limbs 
[of the victim]."~ The Board summarized testimony regarding the victim's injuries: 
[The victim] received an examination atthe dispensary and later went to the 
hospital for treatment. He apparently had several bruises about he head and 
face, his ankles and hands were bandaged, and according to witnesses, he e med 
to be suffering considerable pain in movement. (R 56, 57, 85, 86, 87). There is
no other testimony in the record relative to the extent or nature of [the victim]'s 
injuries .... 
In view of the complete lack of evidence as to the nature, extent and type of the 
injuries sustained by [the victim] the proof and the findings are insufficient o 
establish the offenses charged [i.e. intentional infliction of grievousbodily harm]. 
However, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of the lesser included 
offense of assault and battery...'35 
The opinion has been read as a case in which the Board concluded that the injuries 
were not serious enough to warrant he description of grievous bodily harm. 36 This 
reading is mistaken: the victim was alleged to have sustained "numerous cuts, abra- 
sions and lacerations (as well as bruises) of the face, body, head and limbs." The 
govermnent proved that the victim's head and face were bruised, that his limbs were 
bandaged, and that he found movement painful. The guilty finding did not match 
the proof, which clearly sustained a finding of simple assault and might have sus- 
tained a finding of grievous bodily harm if the charge had matched the proof. The 
Board of Review decision does not offer precedent for the proposition that bruising, 
bandages and pain are insufficient to warrant a finding of grievous bodily harm. 
United States v. Bolton, 3r a 1952 Army Board of Review decision, is some- 
times used to illustrate the kinds of injuries which warrant a charge of aggravated 
assault. 3s In fact, the opinion has no precedential value since the accused was charged 
and convicted under the 1948 Articles of War which did not distinguish between 
ordinary and aggravated assaults: 9 
An Army Board of Review applied the Manual's discussion of grievous bodily 
harm to the injuries which the victim had sustained in United States v. Salazar, and 
concluded that accused's conviction of aggravated assault could not be sustained: ° 
The victim had been stabbed in the back, near his shoulder blade, with a knife seven 
inches long. The Board of Review described the wound as a "laceration," and sum- 
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marized the evidence. The examining physician was Dr. Iwata. His examination of 
the laceration 
gave [him] the impression that it did not penetrate into the chest cavity. Captain 
Iwata applied "several four-four bandages of gauze" to the wound and wrapped 
it with an "X bandage," and had [the victim] transported tothe Sapporo hospi- 
tal in an ambulance. [The victim] remained in the hospital for two days where 
his wound was given "a couple of stitches" and he received "shots every day" 
(R 31,50-51). 41 
Here is the Board's rationale for overturning the aggravated assault conviction: 
Although the use of a knife was dangerous in that it was used in such a manner 
that it was likely to produce grievous bodily harm, it did not, in fact, inflict 
serious injury. Although the offense found includes the finding that the griev- 
ous bodily harm consisted of "a deep cut," there is no evidence that it was a 
deep cut. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence sustains only so much of the 
finding of guilty as finds the accused guilty of an assault likely to produce 
grievous bodily harm by means of a knife. 42 
The case has been read as a holding that the wound wasn't  serious enough to war- 
rant the charge. 43 Alternatively, the case may be read for the proposition that a guilty 
finding of a charge of grievous bodily harm which includes reference to "a deep 
cut," when there is no evidence of a deep cut, must be overturned. 44Because the 
guilty trmding was not consistent with the evidence, the Board could only approve a
guilty finding of a less serious offense and did not conclude that the wound was 
trivial. 45 This alternative reading is more consistent with the language of the opinion. 
United States v. Miles, a 1953 Army Board of Review decision, is often con- 
sidered the definitive military legal opinion on grievous bodily harm. 45a Miles was 
convicted of assault with an iron bar "wherein grievous bodily harm was intention- 
ally inflicted. "46 The victim sustained a two and a half inch cut on the scalp which 
penetrated to the skull; the wound required at least half a dozen stitches, and the 
medical officer who examined the victim the following day testified 
... the left posterior portion of the scalp had lacerations which had been sewn up. 
Around this was a great deal of feeling and it was tender. I gave the man a psychi- 
atric examination i case he had a brain injury but there didn't seem to be any- 
thing except hat he was hazy. He was slow in answering questions. He was well 
oriented and knew where he was... [while the wound was of a type that] could 
cause some serious effects [he didn't actually observe any serious complications.] 47 
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The Board concluded that the Manual for Courts-Martial's definition "leaves a 
vacuum between minor injuries on the one hand and serious injuries on the other 
hand without a test or guide to determine ither. ''4S Turning to civilian court deci- 
sions it identified a number of factors relied on in determining whether an injury 
was severe nough to warrant conviction of aggravated assault: 
1. hospitalization or confinement to bed or room; 
2. persistence of injury or its adverse ffects; 
3. severe pain or suffering; 
4. unconsciousness induced; 
5. medical testimony as to whether the injury was serious; 
6. unusual force or violence applied; and 
7. interference with normal activities. 
The Board went to observe that: "Some courts have probably been influenced 
by the fact that the victim was female... ; by the comparative size and strength of 
the assailant and victim... ; and by the weapon used .... In view of the fact that it 
is the character and extent of the injury with which we are and should be concerned, 
it is believed that, aside from the proposition that the question is ordinarily one for 
the jury, only the facts (1) through (7) should be given any consideration i deter- 
mining whether any injury constitutes 'grievous bodily harm' or 'serious bodily 
injury."49 Applying these criteria to the victim's injury, the Board in the Miles case 
concluded that the issue was fairly presented to the court and that there was no legal 
reason to overturn the conviction. 
In United States v. Dejewski, decided in 1953, the U.S. Court of Military Ap- 
peals spoke for the first time on the issue of "grievous bodily harm. ''5° The court 
concluded that the term "grievous" was used in its conventional sense, no explana- 
tory instruction was needed and ruled that the victim's testimony, unsupported by 
medical evidence, that he had sustained a fractured jaw and had been hospitalized 
for twenty-three days was sufficient to establish the fact that he had sustained griev- 
ous bodily harm. 
A Coast Guard Board of Review was the first appellate panel to reverse a 
conviction of grievous bodily harm because the injuries were not serious enough to 
warrant he conviction of the offense. The accused in United States v. Cabuag was 
one of five Coast Guardsmen charged with attacking an Army sergeant. 51Two were 
tried before a magistrate in a civilian court, fined $125 and $200 respectively, and 
given thirty day suspended sentences. Two others were tried with the accused and 
acquitted. The accused was convicted of aggravated assault and given the maximum 
punishment available to a special court martial: a bad conduct discharge, reduction 
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to the lowest enlisted grade, forfeiture of pay, and confinement at hard labor for six 
months. The Coast Guard Board of Review's opinion, reducing the conviction to 
one of simple assault, was careful not to say that the vict im's injuries (deep lacera- 
tions of the forehead and eyebrow, requiring six stitches; two huge black eyes, mul- 
tiple lacerations and abrasions--a l l  requiring two days of hospitalization and twelve 
additional days of treatment) did not constitute grievous bodi ly harm: 
In the case before us the question of whether the injuries constitute "grievous 
bodily harm" would appear distinctly to be one of fact to be determined in the 
light of the surrounding circumstances. Here the court-martial decided this 
question of fact adversely to the accused. We do not say as a matter of law 
that the evidence cannot support such a finding. We are clearly empowered, 
however, to decide the question of fact differently from members of the court. 
[citing authority] Our concern, as stated at the outset of this decision [where 
the cases of the other four were summarized], is whether it would not better 
accord with the interests of justice here to determine the fact question in favor 
of the accused. 52
In the instant ease no special weapon such as a pool cue [as in Lara] or an iron 
bar [as in Miles] was used; there was no unusually violent single blow [as in 
Miles]; there was no suspected brain injury [as in Miles]; there is not even any 
testimony as to pain and suffering as in the Lara case. It is true that there was 
hospitalization a d stitches, but it does not appear that the wounds were any- 
thing but superficial and it is attested that they cleared up in a short time. The 
two black eyes, despite their size, plainly constitute only "minor injuries," as 
declared by para. 207b(2) MCM. 
Upon all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, therefore, it is our 
determination that it would better accord with the interests of justice to differ 
from the court in the resolution of the question of fact here, and to hold that 
the injuries did not amount to "grievous bodily harm" within the contempla- 
tion of Article 128(b)(1) UCMJ. Since we find as a fact that the assault was 
simple rather than aggravated, a bad conduct discharge is illegal; moreover, a 
reduction in the other provisions of the sentence appears to be warranted, 
especially in view of the disposition made in the magistrate "scourt of the 
other two participants. 53 
The Board modif ied the sentence to provide for reduction in grade and confinement 
and forfeiture of pay for three months. 
The Board made it clear that it had found no legal errors in the conviction but 
that, under the circumstances, the sentence was too severe. Rather than ordering a 
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rehearing on the sentence, the Board used the peculiar circumstances of the case to 
justify its ruling that only a finding of simple assault would be approved. These 
circumstances fell into two categories: the punishment imposed on the other two 
individuals convicted of the same offense, and the comparatively minor nature of 
the offense. 
Twenty-one years were to pass before the military justice system reported a
case interpreting the term "grievous bodily harm." In United States v. Spearman, a
1974 Court of Military Appeals decision, the accused had stabbed his victim four 
times; three of the wounds were in the victim's ide, and one was in his shoulder. 54 
The accused contended that the harm was not grievous and that the charge should 
not have been sent to the jury because none of the cuts were disfiguring and dis- 
abling and did not require hospitalization, although they did require stitching. The 
Court rejected his argument, looking to civilian cases and concluding: 
The consideration common to these cases is that there was some injury more 
severe than that involved in the ordinary assault nd that the issue is generally 
best left to the faetffmders [citing cases]. We beli ve that the same consider- 
ations apply here and that the victim's wounds in this case transcended any 
ordinary battery, endangered his health, and constituted injuries of uch a seri- 
ous nature as to amount to grievous bodily harm2 ~ 
The opinion seems to turn on three criteria: the wounds which were alleged to 
constitute grievous bodily harm were inflicted with a weapon; they required stitch- 
ing; and treatment took place at a hospital. None of the factors are dispositive but 
they were used to explain why the trial judge acted properly in submitting the case 
to the jury. 
Fifteen more years were to pass before the issue was again raised in a reported 
appellate decision. In United States v. Haynes a 1989 Army Court of Military Re- 
view case, the accused contended that the vidence was legally insufficient to estab- 
lish that his assault resulted in grievous bodily harm26 He had sliced his victim 
across the chest and arm but the physician who stitched up the wounds said that the 
injury to the chest was superficial since it did not affect musculature, and injury to 
the ann was not serious because it was not a threat o life or limb. The Court rejected 
the argument, citing Spearman sauthority that decisions as to the seriousness of an 
injury should be left to the factfinders, and concluded with the statement; "Our 
review of the evidence leads us to the same conclusion as the trial court and we find 
that grievous bodily injury did occur in this case. "57 
When the Donnel Jones case was submitted to the Army Court of Military Re- 
view, military jurisprudence had forty years of experience with the term "grievous 
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bodily harm" as it had been used in the Manuals for Courts-Martial. 58 On three occa- 
sions appeals courts had overturned a conviction on the grounds that grievous bodily 
harm had not been established: the Lara and Salazar decisions in 1952 where the 
prosecution failed to establish the injuries alleged, and the Cabuag decision a year 
later where, in order to achieve parity of punishment, a Coast Guard Board of Review 
substituted its view of the facts for that arrived at by the jury. Donnell Jones' lawyers 
had three options: they could argue, as in Cabuag, that the appeals panel should act as 
a facttrmder and reject he findings of the trial court; they could attempt to find funda- 
mental differences between the facts as charged and the facts a proven and, as in Lara 
and Salazar, have the verdict overturned on those grounds; or, they could attempt to 
persuade the court that, for the first time, an appeals panel should apply the definition 
of grievous bodily harm in the Manual for Courts-Martial to the victim's injuries and 
conclude, as a matter of law, that the injuries did not satisfy the definition. 
In fact, appellant's counsel asserted that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Vender 
did not satisfy the legal criteria for grievous bodily harm established by the Miles 
decision and subsequently applied by appellate courts in the military system: 59 
Ms. Vender's injuries were not "of a graver and more severe character than t 
resulting from a simple assault and battery". 6°In layman's terms, Vender had a 
black eye and a bloody nose--the xact examples that the Manual [for Courts 
Martial] gives as being "minor injuries" as opposed to grievous bodily harm. 
These injuries are the classic, archetypical injuries that people receive as the 
result of an ordinary everyday simple assault and battery. The type of injuries 
that kids playing and fighting in neighborhoods get every day of the year. 6~ 
But counsel did not ask the court to overturn the decision on the legal grounds 
that the offense charged had not been proven. Instead, he asked the court to substi- 
tute its judgement as a fact finder for that of the jury. 
Applying the factors which the Miles opinion had taken into consideration: 
"persistence of the injury and its adverse ffects, severity of pain or suffering, 
... hospitalization or confinement to bed or room, unconsciousness induced, 
... interference with normal activities and medical testimony. "~2 Vender's inju- 
ries in the instant case are not "grievous bodily harm" under any reasonable 
definition of the term. Just as the Coast Guard Board of review did in Cabuag, 
this Court ought o determine this question of fact in favor of the appellant. 63 
The Army Court of  Military Review unanimously accepted the Cabuag 
argument: 
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The victim required no medical treatment or surgery. She suffered no l ss of 
function or disfigurement. There was no danger to her life, health, or limb. The 
pain was neither persistent nor severe. After reviewing the evidence in accor- 
dance with Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, we are not satisfied 
that the victim's injuries amount o "grievous bodily harm." [citing Cabuag, 
Salazar, and Lara.] 64 
Arguably the Jones decision had no direct effect on the military justice system 
because unpublished opinions have little or no precedential value. Moreover, asub- 
sequent unanimous Army Court of Military Review opinion, United States v. Brian 
M. Chapman, joined by two of the same judges, distinguished Jones and held that 
grievous bodily harm had been proven? 5 A comparison of injuries, as they were 















Victim rendered momentarily unconsciousness. 
No loss of consciousness. 
Victim suffered a comminuted fracture of the nose. 
Nose simply described as broken. 
A hemorrhage on the sclera (coating on the eyeball). 
Hematoma (swelling containing blood) and reddening of the right eye. 
Significant swelling and bruising around the eye and nose. 
No parallel statement in the opinion; the opinion refers to a 5 cm. cut on 
the nose and the Appellant's Brief refers to swelling. 6~ 
Victim treated at emergency room. 
No parallel statement in the opinion; however, the night of the incident 
the victim was taken by the military police to a civilian clinic for treatment. 67 
Two follow-up visits to battalion aid station. 
No parallel statement and no evidence in the record of trial. 
Victim testified he was in pain for about two weeks; it was a month 
before the blood cleared from his eye, and he still had nosebleeds dur- 
ing PT runs three months later. 
Contrary to the opinion's tatement that the pain was neither persistent 
nor severe, Mrs. Vender testified that the after effects lasted for a "couple 
of weeks," and that the pain was moderate during the day and "heavy at 
night."6s 
Military prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges will never have the oppor- 
tunity to make this comparison because neither opinion has been published and the 
Michael E Noone and Mary Jo Wiley 81 
records of trial have been retired. However, they will read, in an official Army pub- 
lication, Jones' lawyer's tatement that: "If a case involves not much more than a 
broken ose or some other common injury, [defense] counsel has precedent [in Jones] 
to support he proposition that grievous bodily harm does not exist."~9 
In summary, it can be said that military lawyers will continue to utilize Miles 
criteria, which rely heavily on observable physical consequences and disregard the 
fact that the victim was a female and the comparative size and strength of the assail- 
ant and victim, factors expressly disregarded by Miles. 7° Of course the description 
of these consequences will be shaped by the testimony of the medical personnel 
who examined the victim. The following section will consider the forensic implica- 
tions of recent medical research on the victims of assault. 
Current Medical Views on the Consequences of a Criminal Attack 
The Miles case was decided in 1953 and relied on precedents which, in many 
cases, dated to the arly years of the twentieth century. Although the somatic effects 
of trauma, and the protocols for treating them, have remained relatively constant, 
late twentieth century medicine has become far more aware of the psychic effects of 
violence. Research is now available which describes the intellectual nd emotional 
consequences of assault and this research, in turn, suggests new modes of diagnosis 
and treatment. The defense lawyer who described his success in the Jones case ob- 
served that "In many cases, doctors will testify that an injury is minor while most 
laypersons initially might believe it to be serious. "71 Alternatively, an apparently 
minor instance of abuse may be serious, and health professionals are now taking 
steps to ensure that such cases receive appropriate reatment. 
In March 1991 the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care 
Organizations (JCAHO) directed hospitals to establish and follow procedures for 
evaluating and treating adult victims of abuse. 72 The Joint Commission's 1993 stan- 
dards require that hospital emergency departments develop criteria for identifying 
possible victims of abuse involving physical assault, rape or other sexual molesta- 
tion, and domestic abuse of elders, spouses, parents, or children. 73 Procedures must 
include patient consent; examination and treatment; and the hospital's responsibil- 
ity for the collection of evidentiary material and the release of information to proper 
authorities. TM The emergency service must maintain a list of agencies that evaluate 
and care for abuse victims 75 and there must be documentation f treatment, referrals 
and reporting. TM Finally, there must be a plan for educating staff on the medico-legal 
criteria for identifying and handling victims of abuse. Military treatment facilities 
are subject to these standards so it can be expected that, after initial physical needs 
82 Feminist Issues/Spring 1994 
are met, emergency room physicians will refer assault victims to a psychiatrist or 
social worker to evaluate and treat asomatic onditions. 
While the accreditation requirement is new, professional recognition of the psy- 
chological needs of physically abused patients can be traced to the 1970s. 77 Although 
much of the literature focuses on rape, child abuse, and recurring domestic violence 
(the "battering syndrome"), procedures developed for the diagnosis and treatment of 
the abused elderly or of battered women TM are appropriate inany case involving physi- 
cal abuse .  79 Health professionals have, in the past en years, become more aware of the 
need to assess the possibility ofPost Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 8° 
While documentation will facilitate proof of injuries, and treatment, the mili- 
tary legal system will have to decide whether the victim has sustained grievous 
bodily harm. s~ If the trauma renders the servicemember medically unfit for further 
military service it would presumably constitute grievous bodily harm within the 
meaning of the Manual for Courts Martial. s2 As the Miles criteria become less clear-- 
no loss of consciousness; outpatient visits instead of hospitalization; persistence of
the injury measured in weeks or days rather than months or years; pain described as
"persistent" rather than "severe"; and only moderate interference with normal ac- 
t ivit ies-the importance of medical testimony increases, a3However, th e term "griev- 
ous bodily harm" has no medical meaning, and the appeals opinions cited in Miles 
to illustrate the use of medical testimony give no guidance on the kind of medical 
testimony which would establish severity. The cases Miles looked to as precedent 
were decided between 1895 and 1943 u and, with one exception s5 were used to illus- 
trate cases where Texas appeals courts had reversed convictions because of medical 
testimony even though the injuries were of a "... nature.., which would probably 
motivate courts of other jurisdictions to affirm. ''s~ 
The Manual for Courts Martial discussion of the term "grievous bodily harm" 
emphasizes the physical consequences of the assault, and attempts to distinguish be- 
tween short term after-effects--a black eye or a bloody nose--from those of longer 
duration. 86" Consequences which would qualify as serious enough to warrant charging 
aggravated assault are described inphysical terms: "fractures," "deep cuts," and "tears." 
The drafters of the Manual did not discuss the possibility that he psychological fter- 
effects of trauma, in themselves orin conjunction with physical aftereffects otherwise 
minor, might be serious enough to constitute grievous bodily harm. There are institu- 
tional, historical, and cultural explanations for this lacuna and the legal implications 
of their silence will be considered inthe final section of this article. Certainly medical 
literature in the past half century--and it must be remembered that the Manual's lan- 
guage was written forty-four years ago, and based on the experience of World War 
II--has come to recognize the potential severity of asomatic trauma. 
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The third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 7 
published by the American Psychiatric Association describes the essential feature of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, as "the development of characteristic symptoms 
following a psychologically distressing event hat is outside the range of usual hu- 
man experience (i.e., outside the range of such common experiences as simple be- 
reavement, chronic illness, business losses, and marital conflict) .... 88 The trauma 
may be experienced alone (e.g., rape or assault) or in the company of groups of 
people... The disorder is apparently more severe and longer lasting when the stressor 
is of human design.'89 While the stressor criterion based on the need for an event o 
be outside the range of usual experience has been criticized 9° as has the requirement 
that symptomatology continue for at least one month, 9~ experts agree that impair- 
ment may be severe and affect nearly every aspect of life. 92 The literature also estab- 
lishes that violent crimes (such as assault) are more psychologically disturbing than 
less violent crimes and thus increase the need for mental health assistance. 93 The 
Miles opinion 94 suggested that persistence of adverse ffects and interference with 
normal activities were indicia of aggravated assault. And although Miles said that 
the fact that the victim was female should have no effect on the criteria for deter- 
mining aggravated assault, maxillofacial (jaw) injuries arising from an assault may 
be more common among women than men. These injuries 95 are often caused by a 
male's assault 9~ and women are more affected than men by facial injuries. 97 It is 
recognized that there are sex related differences inhealth and illness 98 and that criminal 
trauma's long term effects on women's health are severe. 99 Thus recent data sug- 
gests that Miles criteria must be applied in the context of medical developments in 
the recognition and treatment of traumatic injuries. However, the question remains: 
when the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial speak of 
grievous "bodily" harm are they speaking only of injuries to the body that can be 
externally observed? That will be the subject of the Fmal section of this article. 
Psychic Injury as a Component of Grievous Bodily Harm 
Traditionally the emotional state of the victim was irrelevant in the law of 
crimes. The offense of assault was established whether the victim shrugged off 
the attack or sustained mental pain for the rest of his life. Criminal law made 
allowance for adverse consequences--mental or physical--by giving judges dis- 
cretion to impose a wide range of punishments dependent on mitigating or aggra- 
vating factors.~°° Victorian efforts o rationalize the criminal justice system by 
classifying and punishing crimes according to the degree of seriousness were du- 
plicated in the United States. 1°1 State statutes which "sought o create a range of 
84 Feminist Issues/Spring 1994 
personal injury offenses focusing upon the means by which the actor caused or 
threatened the injury, the person upon whom the injury or threat was inflicted, and 
the seriousness of the injury caused or threatened" served as models for the Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice.~°2 
However there were two differences between state assault statutes and the 
UCMJ. The typical state assault statute provided for more severe punishments han 
the UCMJ. New York was representative: "maiming (15 years [maximum imprison- 
ment]); assault with a deadly weapon or a destructive or noxious thing (ten years), 
inflicting grievous bodily harm or assault with any weapon (five years), and simple 
assault or battery (one year). 1°3 Under the UCMJ, the maximum punishment for 
maiming was seven years; for assault with a deadly weapon three years; and for 
simple assault or battery six months. The UCMJ prescribed five years confinement 
as the maximum punishment for intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm with 
or without a weapon. 1°4 Unlike the UCMJ, those state statutes which utilized sever- 
ity of injury as a factor formally defined "serious bodily injury" (the term that had 
come to replace "grievous bodily harm"), and distinguished it from bodily injury. 
The Miles survey ~°5 of American law concerning grievous bodily harm assumed that 
the Manual's descriptive definition was identical with state statutes which the cases 
cited in Miles interpreted and that state statutes defining grievous bodily harm could 
be treated as sufficiently similar so that differences between statutes did not affect 
state courts' judicial interpretations of the term. ~°6 In 1992, a year after the Jones 
and Chapman cases were decided by Army courts, American Law Reports pub- 
lished a comprehensive survey of state and federal approaches to the problem posed 
in those cases. Entitled "Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggra- 
vated Assault," this analysis of over four hundred appeals court decisions illumi- 
nated distinctions created by differing statutory language. ~°7 Only five opinions 
addressed the issue of whether mental injury is comprehended by statutory defini- 
tions of serious injury. In four cases, decided in two states, the response was nega- 
tive. Arizona's statute defining aggravated assault requires "serious bodily injury" 
which is in turn defined as "injury which creates areasonable risk of death, or which 
causes serious and permanent disfigurement, or serious impairment of health or loss 
or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb. ~°s In 1983 an 
Arizona appeals court concluded that the legislature intended that the impairment 
be physical, and that the adverse motional consequences of a rape would not sus- 
tain a conviction for aggravated assault ~°9 and its precedent was followed in a 1987 
Arizona appeals court decision interpreting the same statutory provision. H° 
Connecticut's a sault statute defines erious physical injury as one which "creates a 
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment 
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of health, or serious lo s or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. "111 In 
State v. Rossie, 112 a 1978 opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that a 
psychiatric diagnosis of post-trauma reaction did not satisfy the statutory require- 
ment for serious physical injury, and that precedent was followed in a 1985 Con- 
necticut Supreme Court decis ion.  113 
Both states' statutes followed the definition of serious bodily injury proposed 
by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code114: "bodily injury which creates 
a substantial risk of death or which causes erious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. ''115 
The Model Code, however, envisioned three categories of assault116: scuffles en- 
tered into by mutual consent, which would be treated as petty misdemeanors (carry 
a maximum term of 30 days imprisonment); assaults which cause bodily injury, 
defined as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition, which 
would be treated as a second degree felony, punishable by maximum term of 10 
years, and aggravated assault which would be treated as a third degree felony, pun- 
ishable by imprisonment in excess of ten years) 17 The Model Code's maximum 
punishment for aggravated assault is more than double that provided for in the UCMJ. 
The federal government 1Isand other states have not attempted a definition 
of the term and have relied on what has been called "the common-law meaning of 
a common-law term. "n9 Only one reported ecision from these jurisdictions has 
considered whether emotional injuries would satisfy the law's requirements. In
State v. Everhardt, a 1990 decision of the South Carolinia Supreme Court, the 
Court concluded that evidence that the victim of sexual assaults had suffered a 
mental injury which required several hospital admissions and medication was suf- 
ficient o support aconviction of aggravated assault causing serious bodily harm. 120 
The Court's reasoning--that bodily harm includes mental injuries which may be 
more severe and of longer duration than their physical counterparts--could be 
applied in an Article 128 UCMJ prosecution without revising the Manual for Courts 
Martial's definition which excludes minor injuries. TM Does The Manual's defini- 
tion need to be reinterpreted? 
Conclusion 
Donnell Jones's case exemplifies the dilemma posed by the present assault 
provisions of the UCMJ. He struck Mrs. Vender under circumstances which war- 
ranted acriminal investigation a d preferment ofcharges. Either he would be charged 
with a simple battery--the same offense which would be charged in a scuffle en- 
tered into by mutual consent--or he would be charged with aggravated assault. The 
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UCMJ, unlike the Model Penal Code, offers no third alternative. 122 Once he was 
charged, the trial judge quite properly decided that the evidence of physical injury 
was sufficient o warrant sending the charge of aggravated assault o the jury. n3 
Although the prosecutor in the Jones case, unlike the prosecutor in the Chapman 
case, made no effort to portray the injury as serious (possibly because the defense 
counsel did not challenge this contention), the jury found Jones guilty of the charged 
offenseJ 24 On appeal, the Army Court of Military Review substituted its judgment 
as a fact finder for that of the jury and concluded that the injury was not serious 
enough to warrant a conviction of aggravated assault. The decision was unpub- 
lished and had it remained unpublicized it would have no effect on anyone other 
than Donnell Jones. 
However the summary of the decision in the Army Lawyer .25 may affect he 
judgments of military lawyers of all the armed services, since the publication is 
distributed throughout the Department ofDefense. The precedential value of United 
States v. Miles TM will be reinforced although the Miles opinion misread three of 
four prior military opinions on aggravated assault and failed to distinguish, in its 
discussion of state cases, those jurisdictions which had statutorily defined serious 
bodily harm from those which had not. 12~ The precedential value of United States 
v. Cabuag neb will be misunderstood to stand for the proposition that judges have 
held, as matter of law, that certain injuries do not constitute grievous bodily in- 
jury ~2s rather than--as was actually the case--that appeals court judges may exer- 
cise their fact finding authority and substitute the jury's judgment for their own. 
Further, the article's emphasis on bodily harm may lead uninformed readers to 
conclude that psychological harm could never be "grievous" within the meaning 
of Article 128. 
The potential for misunderstanding is particularly grave as military hospitals, 
in response to JCAHO accreditation standards, establish more comprehensive pro- 
tocols to identify assault victims and health care providers trive to ensure that the 
psychological needs of trauma victims are met. n8 The record of trial in the 1991 
aggravated assault case of United States v. Donna L. Barnes, illustrates military 
medicine's response. The Court of Military Appeals opinion describes the assault 
which, like Mrs. Vender's, occurred at an Army cassern in Germany. "For the next 
hour or 2 [sic] Pvt. S was subjected to various as aults. Appellant [Barnes] repeat- 
edly hit Pvt. S in the face with her fists and a combat boot while holding on to Pvt. 
S's hair. Appellant also lit PVT S's hair and T shirt on fire. Finally, appellant and 
Pvt. D took off all of Pvt. S's clothes, tied her hands and feet to the bed with shoe- 
laces, and stuffed a sock in her mouth. The appellant proceeded to beat Pvt. S with 
a plastic coat hanger, m29 
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While Barnes's defense counsel did not argue, as had defense counsel in the 
Jones case, that these were "the type of injuries that kids playing and fighting in 
neighborhoods get every day of the year," Private S, like Mrs. Vender, suffered no 
loss of function or disfigurement. ~3° There was no danger to her life, health or 
limb. The pain was neither persistent nor severe. These facts had persuaded the 
Army Court of Military Review to conclude that Mrs. Vender had not sustained 
grievous bodily harm. TM However Private S, unlike Mrs. Vender, was seen by a 
military physician and admitted to hospital although her injuries were superfi- 
cial/ 32 Unlike Mrs. Vender, Private S was X-rayed; X-rays of the chest, lungs, c- 
spine (neck) and facial bones were within normal limits, indicating no clinical 
fractures. Unlike Mrs. Vender, Private S was sent for an emergency psychiatric 
consult after her physical injuries were treated. A psychiatrist concluded that she 
was not suicidal but referred her for further assessment. Two days later, in a fol- 
low-up psychiatric exam, concern was expressed over the emotional trauma re- 
suiting from the beating and arrangements were made for outpatient treatment 
after her release from the hospital. Private S sustained no fractures or dislocated 
bones, no deep cuts or torn members of her body and no serious damage to inter- 
nal organs. In fact, the only Miles criterion she clearly met was hospitalization-- 
but single persons like Pvt S. who are barrack residents are routinely hospitalized 
in order to ensure that they are adequately cared for. I f  asked, Mrs. Vender prob- 
ably would have refused hospitalization. She had to care for her two children 
because her husband was away. ~33 
Barnes's conviction and sentence to a dishonorable discharge, confinement 
for four years, and total forfeitures has been confirmed. Perhaps she merited the 
punishment--as Donnell Jones did not--because her assault extended over two 
hours and reflected a depraved mind. However, if Miles criteria, and the language 
of the Manual for Courts Martial are to be taken literally--the question remains: 
were Private S's injuries more grievous than Mrs. Vender's? We conclude that 
they were not. Like the victim in the Chapman case, her treatment was more com- 
prehensive and the prosecutor was more aggressive. TM Our conclusion suggests 
that legal and medical considerations dictate that the assault provisions promul- 
gated by the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts in 1775, and amended by the 
Congress of the United States in 1950 need to be re-examined. We believe that the 
fundamental statute would benefit from revision: in order to distinguish truly mi- 
nor affrays from those where some injury was inflicted, as suggested by the Ameri- 
can Law Institute; and to provide for an array of maximum sentences which would 
provide that aggravated assault be charged only in the most serious cases--leav- 
ing the Donna Barnes in the criminal justice system to be tried for assault causing 
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bodily harm. However, neither the statute nor the Manual for Courts Martial need 
be amended to provide for more sensitivity among lawyers to the psychic conse- 
quences of assault. Prosecutors must ensure that victims, unlike Mrs. Vender, de- 
scribe the aftermath of the trauma. 135 Judges at both the trial and appellate level 
must treat Miles criteria with suspicion. Men and women in the armed forces will, 
on occasion, continue to strike each other. It is up to the law to decide when the 
blow is "cruel hard." It could do better. 
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